Ed25519 node-to-node authentication, HTTP signature headers, gossip auth, session attestation, and TX-plan quorum witness verification.
All node-to-node communication is authenticated using Ed25519 signatures. There is no shared secret, no TLS client certificates, and no central authority. Each node has a persistent Ed25519 keypair that serves as its network identity.
| Component | Library | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Ed25519 signatures | TweetNaCl.js (libsodium-compatible) | All node signatures |
| SHA-256 hashing | @noble/hashes | Body hashing, commitments |
| JSON serialization | Canonical JSON (sorted keys) | Deterministic message encoding |
Every node-to-node HTTP request includes three headers:
X-Node-Pubkey: <hex-encoded Ed25519 public key>
X-Node-Timestamp: <Unix epoch milliseconds>
X-Node-Signature: <hex-encoded Ed25519 signature>The signature covers a canonical string constructed as:
signedPayload = "${method}:${pathname}:${timestamp}:${bodyHash}"Where bodyHash is the SHA-256 hex digest of the request body (or empty string for bodyless requests).
Replay protection: the receiving node rejects any request where the timestamp is more than 30 seconds from the receiver's clock. This bounds the replay window without requiring synchronized clocks beyond NTP accuracy.
Body binding: including the body hash in the signed payload prevents an attacker from intercepting a signed request and substituting a different body.
Gossip protocol messages use a simplified auth scheme:
signature = Ed25519.sign("gossip-auth:{timestamp}")The gossip auth signature is attached to every gossip message and verified by each receiving peer. The timestamp provides the same 30-second replay window as HTTP auth.
When a node serves UI content to a client, it produces a session attestation that binds the served content to the serving node and the current cohort:
attestationInput = hash(
sorted(cohortNodeIds) +
contentHash +
requestPath +
servingNodeId +
timestamp
)The attestation is signed by the serving node and can be verified by any other node in the cohort. If a node serves tampered content, its attestation will not match what peers expect for the same content hash.
Transaction plans require 2/3 witness agreement before execution. The witness verification process:
Rogue node detection: if a witness signs contradictory attestations (approving and rejecting the same plan, or approving different plans for the same round), this is flagged as rogue behavior. The detection is deterministic and verifiable by any node holding both conflicting attestations.